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NOTES
EMINENT DOMAIN: COMPENSATION FOR PARTIAL
TAKING OF FARM LAND IN CONSTRUCTING
LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAYS
INTRODUCTION
The concept of the limited-access highway has arisen as a par-
tial answer to the needs of a modern "generation on wheels." This
type of highway, sometimes called the "freeway" or "parkway," is
designed especially for through traffic, with either limited or no
access to abutting landowners, and few, if any, cross streets.1 Rec-
ognizing the need for highways of this type, the federal govern-
ment has appropriated money to aid the states in the construction
of limited-access highways.2 This proposed network of new high-
ways has been officially christened the Interstate Highway System.'
As part of this system, Minnesota can build 937 miles of limited-
access highways in the next thirteen years.4
The nature and purpose of a limited-access highway require
that it be constructed in rural areas and that towns and cities be
by-passed.5 This construction plan can be of considerable import
to the farmer. As an example, if twenty acres" of a 200 acre farm7
are condemned for the highway, the farmer will not only lose the
use of those twenty acres, but his farm may be completely severed,
with ninety acres left on each side of the highway. If he has no
direct access from one ninety acre tract to the other, he may not
be able to use both tracts as one farm unit. In turn, his buildings
may be too large and he may have too much machinery for the
reduced size of his available farm acreage.
Though the situation may look dismal to the farmer, he will not
be left without some compensation for his loss. However, determi-
1. Levin, Public Control of Highway Access and Roadside Develop-
ment 13 (Public Roads Administration, Federal Works Agency, 1947).
2. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 378, 23 U.S.C.A. § 158
(Supp. 1956).
3. Ibid.
4. Interview with Ward Gronfield, attorney, Minnesota Highway De-
partment, Feb. 21, 1957.
5. Minnesota's Interstate Highway is proposed to by-pass all cities
except Minneapolis, St. Paul, Duluth, and possibly Fargo-Moorhead. Inter-
view with Ward Gronfield, attorney, Minnesota Highway Department, Feb.
21, 1957.
6. The highway department will condemn a right-of-way with an
average width of approximately 300 feet. This means that approximately
thirty-seven acres per mile of highway will be taken. Interview with Ward
Gronfield, attorney, Minnesota Highway Department, Feb. 21, 1957.
7. The average acreage on Minnesota farms in 1954 was 195 acres, with
120,100 out of 165,200 farms in the 100 to 500-acre class. Engene, Minnesota
Farms Are Getting Larger, Minnesota Farm Business Notes, Aug. 27, 1956,
p. 3 .
nation of the amount of his compensation raises many problems.
Somewhat analogous problems have arisen in the past in determin-
ing compensation for the taking of land and legal rules have been
developed in attempt to solve them. This Note will re-evaluate
those rules to determine their applicability to the problems pre-
sented in compensating for the condemnation of farm land for lim-
ited-access highways.
THE COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
Although almost every state constitution," as well as the Fed-
eral Constitution,9 requires that "just compensation" be given when
land is condemned for public use, these provisions become meaning-
ful only through judicial interpretation. As the condemnation sit-
uations become more complex, the judicial application of the just
compensation provisions becomes more difficult. Before consider-
ation of the problems presented in compensating for the taking of
farm land for limited-access highways, a few general considerations
are in order.
A. Market Value
Two concepts of value have been rejected and one generally
accepted as the measure of just compensation. First, "value of the
land to the taker" has been rejected since it would depend on the
need of the condemning authority. If value to the taker were used
to determine the amount of compensation, the price of the land
might be raised far beyond what the landowner could receive from
any other purchaser on the open market.' Secondly, "value of the
land to the owner" has generally been rejected since it might mis-
lead the jury into compensating for such intangibles as sentimental
attachment," and could make the cost of new highways prohibitive.
"Market value" is the generally accepted measure of just com-
pensation.1 2 Broadly defined, market value is that price which would
be determined in negotiations between a seller who is willing but
not obligated to sell and a buyer who is willing but not obligated to
8. E.g., Mich. Const. art. 13, § 1; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 13; N.Y. Const.
art. 1, § 7; Ohio Const. art. 1, § 19.
9. U.S. Const amend. V.
10. Jahr, Eminent Domain: Valuation and Procedure § 68 (1953)(hereinafter cited as Jahr) ; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 12.21 (3d ed. 1951)
(hereinafter cited as Nichols). However, the land's special adaptability for
highway purposes may be taken into consideration. See In the Matter of
Superintendent of Highways, 193 Misc. 617, 84 N.Y.S.2d 78 (County Ct.
1948).
11. Jahr § 69; 4 Nichols § 12.22.
12. Jahr § 70; 4 Nichols § 12.2; 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent
Domain § 17 (2d ed. 1953) (hereinafter cited as Orgel).
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buy.'" Though the market value test may be harsh as applied in
some situations,14 if it is applied liberally, rather than strictly, it
will be in most cases an adequate and workable measure of just
compensation.' 5
B. Noncompensable Injuries
Adherence to the concept of market value of the property taken
as the measure of compensation would seemingly exclude from the
determination of market value those losses of the landowner which
do not affect market value. But this is not the distinction that has
been used to draw the line between compensable and noncompensa-
ble losses. Instead, the courts will hold that a particular loss is not
to be considered in determining market value on the grounds that
the injuries are either: too speculative ;'6 a personal loss as distin-
guished from a property loss ;17 not different from the loss suffered
by the public in general ;1s or not resulting from the use of property
taken from the complaining landowner, but from the use of prop-
erty taken from others.' 9
On the facts of some of the cases involving non-compensable
injuries, the court could have arrived at the same result by reason-
ing that the particular loss did not affect market value of the prop-
erty taken. Thus, where a farmer claims a loss because of his senti-
13. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; Louisiana High-
way Comm'n v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193 (1944); In re Smith St
Bridge, 234 App. Div. 583, 255 N.Y.S. 801 (4th Dep't 1932).
14. For example, in the midwest dairy area there is little demand for
small farms because economic developments are pressing for large farms.
Interview with Dr. Philip Raup, professor, Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of Minnesota Institute of Agriculture, March 9, 1957.
In this situation, when the farm is condemned and compensation is based on
market value, the award may be much less than the actual capital investment
of the farmer.
15. For an exhaustive discussion and citation of cases on the admissi-
bility of evidence to determine market value, see 5 Nichols §§ 18.4 (opinion
evidence) ; 19.1, 19.3 (income) ; 19.2 (rent) ; 20.1, 20.2 (costs) 21.2 (sales
of the property itself) ; 21.3 (sales of similar property) ; 21.4 (offers). See
also Jahr §§ 132-58.
16. E.g., Miller v. United States, 137 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1943) (mental
hazard) ; Housing Authority v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295 (1942) (loss
of music pupils, inconvenience) ; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Hildreth, 225 S.W.
583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (possibility of contamination of water by oil, and
frightening of cattle because of inspection crews).
17. E.g., Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893)(loss of business) ; United States v. 257.654 Acres of Land, 72 F. Supp. 903
(D. Hawaii 1947) (business losses).
18. E.g., Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131 Pac.
409 (1913) (vibration, noise of street railway) ; Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.
v. Lee, 409 Ill. 19, 98 N.E.2d 746 (1951).
19. E.g., City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W.2d 909
(1955); Lewisburg & N.R.R. v. Dudley, 161 Tenn. 546, 30 S.W.2d 278
(1930) (damages resulting from use of a train on property taken from others
held not a part of compensation for property taken from condemnee).
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mental attachment for a farm which has been in the family for
generations, a court will say that this is too speculative a loss to be
considered in the determination of market value. The court could
have said that sentimental attachment is not a factor which affects
the price which purchasers on the open market would pay for the
land.2 0
In other cases, the loss appears to be one which affects market
value; however, the courts do not consider it in determining mar-
ket value. For example, most courts do not consider loss of goodwill
on the ground that this is a personal rather than a property loss. 21
Yet, in private negotiations, goodwill is often a factor in determin-
ing the selling price of the property.
In searching for a justification for this seemingly arbitrary label-
ing, which constitutes a departure from market value as a test, one
comes across the oft-quoted statement in the cases that "the award
must be fair to the condemnor as well as to the condemnee. ' ' 22 In
effect, the court is saying that "if we compensate for this type of
injury, the cost of public improvements would come too high."
With thousands of acres of land to be condemned for the Interstate
Highway System, it may be well for the courts to re-examine their
reasons for not compensating for an injury suffered by the land-
owner, in order to avoid the possibility of a rather arbitrary dis-
allowance of compensation merely to save the public a few dollars.2 3
PARTIAL TAKING
When only part of a landowner's property is condemned, the
courts have universally held that the constitutional requirement of
just compensation means that compensation must be given for
20. As was mentioned previously, after the farm is severed by the
limited-access highway, the farmer's machinery may have too large a capacity
for the now available farm acreage. This may be an example of a loss which
would be considered a personal loss and therefore noncompensable. However,
the real reason it may be noncompensable is that this loss would have no
effect on market value. On the other hand, if the machinery is of the type
which is ordinarily sold with the land, the loss may decrease the market value
of the land, and the landowner should be compensated. This is similar to the
distinction made, in considering removal costs, between fixtures and personal
property. See, e~g., United States v. 40,558 Acres of Land, 62 F. Supp. 98(D.Del. 1945) ; Kansas City So. Ry. v. Anderson, 88 Ark. 129, 113 S.W. 1030(1908).
21. E.g., It re Edward J. Jeffries Home Housing Project, 306 Mich.
638, 11 N.W.2d 272 (1943) ; People v. Johnson & Co., 219 App. Div. 285, 219
N.Y.S. 741 (1st Dep't 1927).
22. E.g., Wilmington Housing Authority v. Harris, 47 Del. (8 Terry)
469, 93 A.2d 518 (Super. Ct. 1952).
23. For an extensive treatment of the points raised in this section, see
Orgel §§ 66-80.
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damages to the remainder as well as for the part taken." These
damages are measured by the reduction in market value of the re-
mainder 25 and are therefore distinguishable from those noncom-
pensable injuries considered in the preceding section which have
no affect on market value either of the part taken or of the re-
mainder.
A. Severance Damages
The taking of a strip of land through the middle of a farm may
leave the condemnee with two tracts partially or completely severed.
This loss of access from one tract to the other is termed "severance
damage" and is measured by the reduction in market value of the
two tracts as a unit.2 6 Three requisites to recovery of severance
damages have been developed by the courts: 1) unity of owner-
ship ;27 2) contiguity of the severed parcels ;28 and 3) unity of use.29
Unity of ownership
The most apparent reason for the unity of ownership require-
ment is that contiguous tracts of land, used as a unit, but owned by
different persons, will probably not be sold as a unit, even though
the market value of the two tracts sold as a unit would be higher
than that of the tracts sold separately. Therefore, the severance of
the two tracts does not constitute a loss to the landowners. They
can still sell their tracts individually as they would have done before
the severance.
The courts have been strict in applying the unity of ownership
requirement. For example, where a man and his wife owned one
tract of land as tenants by the entirety and the wife owned another
tract in fee, both contiguous and used as one farm, it was held that
severance damages could only be awarded for injury to the remain-
der of the tract from which a strip was taken.30 In this case the two
24. E.g., United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911); People v.
Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954); Cedar Rapids, I.F. &
N.W. Ry. v. Ryan, 36 Minn. 546, 33 N.W. 35 (1887); Kamo Elec.
Cooperative v. Baker, 287 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1956). Some state constitutions
expressly require compensation for taking and damages. E.g., Cal. Const. art.
1, § 14; Ill. Const. art. 2, § 13.
25. E.g., Kamo Elec. Cooperative v. Baker, 287 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1956);
Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 89 S.E.2d 577 (1955).
26. See the discussion on injury to "use value" of the land, pp. 119-20
infra.
27. Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E. 234 (1910) ; Duggan
v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1932).
28. E.g., Chicago v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 8 Ill. 2d 341, 134
N.E.2d 296 (1956).
29. E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App.
2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936).
30. Tillman v. Lewisburg & N. Ry., 133 Tenn. 554, 182 S.W. 597 (1915).
See also McIntyre v. Board of County Comm'rs, 168 Kan. 115, 211 P.2d 59(1949).
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tracts had been used as one farm unit and would undoubtedly have
been sold as a unit by the husband and wife, if and when they did
decide to sell. The now severed parcels would bring a lower price
on the market than the two tracts sold as a unit before condemna-
tion; yet, no compensation was given for this reduction in market
value of the farm unit.
A "dead hand" application of the unity of ownership require-
ment can produce results such as that illustrated by the case above.
This result seems inconsistent with the reason for the requirement.
Perhaps the requirement should be rephrased to take into account
those situations where two or more tracts of land, owned by more
than one person, would almost certainly have been sold as one con-
tiguous unit. One court has made an exception to the unity of own-
ership requirement and allowed severance damages when, several
contiguous tracts of property were owned by different people but
governed by a contract for joint use. 31 Another exception should
be made where two tracts, contiguous and used as one unit, are
owned by closely related persons, such as husband and wife.
Contiguity of severed parcels
Some courts have recognized the possible inequity which could
result if the requirement that the severed parcels must have been
contiguous to one another is applied too strictly. Those courts have
said that when two parcels of property are so inseparably connected
in use that the injury or destruction of one must necessary injure
the other, a physical connection is not necessary and severance
damages will be given if the condemnation now prevents use of the
severed parcels as one unit.3 2 Thus tempered, the contiguity require-
ment seems to be a reasonable means of rejecting spurious claims.
Unity of use
The unity of use requirement should also be applied with one
eye on the result. For example, a tract of land may be owned by one
person but rented as two separate farms. Although the tract is not
used as a single unit, it could be sold as a unit. When part of the
property is taken for a limited-access highway, the landowner suf-
ers a loss since the severed parcels may not now be sold as a unit.
The fact that the landowner is not using his land as a unit should
31. County of Smith v. Labore, 37 Kan. 480, 15 Pac. 577 (1887).
32. E.g., Darlington v. Pennsylvania R.R., 278 Pa. 307, 123 Atl. 284
(1924) ; but see Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93,
133 P.2d 777 (1943). A highway previously separating the farm into two
parcels does not destroy its contiguity. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist.
v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Min. 442, 277 N.W. 394 (1937).
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make little difference if the land could be sold as a unit for a higher
price than as severed parcels.33
B. The Problem of Access
When a limited-access highway is constructed through a farm,
the farmer may lose access not only to other parts of his land but
also to the highway. 83 This loss, like severance damage, is measured
by the reduction in market value of the remainder.
Historical background
Since the Interstate Highway System is to be of the limited-
access type,85 with the states doing most of the actual condemning
of land, 86 state provisions for acquisition of easements of access be-
come increasingly important. In understanding and evaluating these
state provisions some historical background of access rights is help-
ful.
Before the development of the automobile, most roads were
built mainly to give abutting landowners access from their property
to neighboring farms, markets, and churches. The roads were
financed solely by the abutting landowners. In a very real sense
these landowners owned the road, though the public was allowed
to use it. As owners, they had a right of access to the road from
any part of their property37
Today, our highways are financed by the taxpayers generally
or by motor-vehicle-users; yet, the law of access rights has not
undergone any significant changes. The abutting landowner still
has a right of access to the ordinary highway and this right is still
recognized as a property right,38 rather than as a revocable license
33. For further treatment of the point, see the discussion on injury to
"use value" of the land, pp. 119-20 infra.
34. For a discussion of the problems presented in this section, see
Cunnyngham, The Limited-Access Highway from a Lawyer's Viewpoint,
13 Mo. L. Rev. 19, 37 (1948).
35. The geometric and construction standards are to be uniform through-
out the states and adopted through cooperation of the State Highway Depart-
ments and the Secretary of Commerce. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
70 Stat. 378, 23 U.S.C.A. § 158(i) (Supp. 1956). The construction stand-
ard adopted is that of the limited-access highway. Interview with Ward
Gronfield, attorney, Minnesota Highway Department, Feb. 21, 1957.
36. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 381, 23 U.S.C.A.
§ 159 (Supp. 1956), provides for federal condemnation and reconveyance to
the states of rights of way if the Secretary of Commerce decides that the
state is unable to acquire the necessary "lands or interests in lands (including
within the term 'interests in lands' the control of access thereto from ad-joining lands)" required for the Interstate Highway System, or cannot
acquire these rights of way promptly.
37. See Cunnynghamn, supra note 34, at 31-32.
38. See, e.g., Gilmore v. State, 208 Misc. 427, 434, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873,
881 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955) ; Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 480,
2 A.2d 842, 847 (1938).
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from the state. Even though the landowner, as an abutter, has con-
tributed nothing to the construction and maintenance of the high-
way, he is given a right of access to the highway for which he must
be compensated when that right of access is condemned.3 9 Whether
or not there is a present day justification for this result will be dis-
cussed later in this section.40
New location or old
A limited-access highway may be established in one of two ways.
It may be constructed in a new location where no highway previ-
ously existed, or it may be created out of an existing highway.
The prevailing view is that when a limited-access highway is
constructed where no highway existed, the abutting landowners
should not be compensated for loss of access since they previously
bad no access.4 1 On the other hand, it could be argued that an abut-
ting landowner has a right of access to a limited-access highway in
a new location just as he would have had a right of access had this
been an ordinary highway.4 2 An abutting landowner, therefore,
should be compensated for the loss of that right. For those who
prefer form to substance, this argument may be appealing. Legal-
istic reasoning aside, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that an
award of damages in this situation would be a pure windfall to the
abutter, since loss of access would not reduce the present market
value of his abutting property. Rights of access were never consid-
ered in the market value of the property before construction of the
39. A right of access may be restricted or destroyed completely without
compensation through the exercise of the state's police power. See, e.g.,
Carazalla v. Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955). The limitations
on the use of this power, however, make it of little value to the state in a
large scale highway construction program. For discussion of the police power,
see Clarke, The Linmited-Access Highway, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111, 119-22
(1952).
40. See p. 114 infra.
41. See, e.g., State v. Clevenger, 291 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1956) ; State v.
Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P2d 783 (1954). For a general discussion of the
problem, see Clarke, supra note 39, at 122-23.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on the question. A
legislative determination of the question was offered by the proposed Minne-
sota Limited-access Statute, H.F. No. 57, § 3, Intro. Jan. 16, 1957, which
provided that "no right of access shall vest in any property abutting upon any
portion of any trunk highway established... after July 1, 1957.... "unless the
commissioner of highways permitted a right of access. However, this section
was excluded from the final version of the statute. See Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 161.415-.416 (Supp. 1957).
42. The court in Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d294 (1945),
in speaking of an ordinary highway, said that, "the creation of a public high-
way at the same time subordinates the land on which it is established to the
easement of access insofar as abutting landowners are concerned .... " Id. at
54, 19 N.W.2d at 397.
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new highway, so the abutter has suffered no loss. It may be ven-
tured that few, if any, courts will adopt the formalistic argument
which would be so costly to the state.
A different problem arises when an existing highway is con-
verted into a limited-access highway. Here, the abutting landowner
clearly has a right of access (whether or not he has made use of
that right) which is taken from him.43 The courts have unanimously
held that in this situation the abutting landowner must be compen-
sated.4" The opposing argument, referring back to the historical in-
troduction to this section, is that an abutting property owner has no
"constitution-given right" to demand compensation for loss of ac-
cess. When the highway was built the abutting landowner was
given the right of access without paying for it. The state, which
gave him the right of access, should not now be required to compen-
sate him for taking it away.45 However, this argument ignores
rather important factors. Most landowners whose lands abut the
highway have expended money in reliance on the existence of access
rights when they purchased their property or when they subse-
quently made improvements. In essence, the abutter has an executed
license.4 6 If, as one noted authority in the field of property has ar-
gued,47 an executed license is really an easement, the courts may
not be too far off base in calling a right of access a property right."'
As a property right, the right of access should be compensated for
when taken.
49
Arguing from the concept of market value, these rights of access
were considered in the market value of the property before con-
demnation. The loss of these rights will decrease the market value
of the property and therefore compensation should be awarded.
43. Prior to a taking it must be established that the state has the power
to acquire rights of access by condemnation. Many states have adopted
statutes expressly authorizing condemnation for limited-access highways,
including acquisition of access rights. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 177.230-
.270 (Baldwin 1955); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 252.51-.55 (1948).
In the absence of a statute, it has been held that the general power of
condemnation does not include the power to condemn rights of access possessed
by the abutting owner on an existing highway. State v. Superior Court, 33
Wash.2d 638, 206 P.2d 1028 (1949). Contra, Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn.
48, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945).
44. E.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818
(1943); Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.
1954) ; Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945) ; Neuweiler v.
Kauer 62 Ohio L. Abs. 536, 107 N.E.2d 779 (Ct. C.P. 1951).
4. See Cunnynghain, supra note 34, at 32-33.
46. See Clarke, Covenants and Interests Running with Land 46-51(1929).
47. Id. at 47.
48. See note 38 supra.
49. All state constitutions require compensation for property taken for
public use. E.g., Minn. Const. art. 1, § 13.
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Service roads
Whether the limited-access highway is established in a new or
old location, the state may build service roads to give the abutting
landowners an indirect access to the main thoroughfare. If the
limited-access highway is built in a new location, the state's con-
struction of service roads is a gift to the abutting landowners. Be-
fore the establishment of the highway they did not have rights of
access and now they have at least an indirect access.
Once again, a wholly different problem arises where an ordi-
nary highway is converted into a limited-access highway. In this
case, even though the state builds a service road, the abutting land-
owner will lose his former direct5 0 access to the highway. This loss
may be substantial. The problem becomes one of formulating a rule
of compensation which recognizes the damage which may be caused
by loss of direct access and also recognizes that the construction of
a service road may mitigate and sometimes eliminate those damages.
A verbal formula adopted by some courts is that "compensation
is not to be given for mere circuity of travel."' However, the appli-
cation of this test may misguide the jury into totally disallowing
compensation merely because a service road has been constructed.
The test is objectionable because of its "black or white" approach
to the problem: has a service road been constructed? If so, no
compensation is awarded since the only damage to the abutter is
that now he must travel further to reach the main thoroughfare.
Thus, under this test, if a small one-lane gravel road is constructed
as a service road, the abutter may receive no compensation even
though he formerly had direct access to a paved highway, and even
though his loss of direct access substantially affects the market value
of the property. In short, the test fails to emphasize the adequacy
of the substituted means of access.
A better rule was announced by the California court in People
v. Ricciardi.5 2 The court in that case held that access damages
would be allowed, even though the state had built a service road,
if the abutter's access rights were substantially impaired. The em-
50. One whose land did not abut the highway before it was converted to
a limited-access highway is not entitled to compensation even though he now
must travel further to reach the highway. E.g., Schnider v. State, 38 Cal.
2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952). The announced reason for this result is that such a
landowner never had direct access to the highway. But this simply restates
the rule. It would appear that the real reason for not compensating the
injured landowner in this situation is that to do so would make the cost of
new highways prohibitive.
51. See, e.g., Gilmore v. State, 208 Misc. 427, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1955) (court shows little concern over the adequacy of the substituted
means of access).
52. 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).
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phasis in this case was on the adequacy of the service road. This
rule recognized both aspects of the problem: 1) that it is necessary
to mitigate damages when a service road is constructed so that the
building of such roads by the state will not be discouraged ;53 and
2) that to totally disallow compensation if any kind of service road
is constructed may be a "taking of property without compensation."
C. Measure of Damages
All courts attempt to give an award which will include compen-
sation both for that part of the property actually taken and for in-
juries to the remainder. In order to arrive at that result, the courts
have developed two verbal formulas: 1) value of the part taken plus
damages to the remainder; and 2) market value of the whole prop-
erty before and after the taking. The first formula considers dam-
ages tothe remainder separately, whereas the second formula lumps
together both value of the property taken and damages to the re-
mainder.
Although theoretically there should be no difference in the award
using either formula, practically, different results may be reached
since one formula may be less confusing than the other for the jury
to apply.54 In the following two sections a few of the improper ap-
plications of the formulas will be discussed.
Value plus damages
In some jurisdictions the jury will be instructed that they are
to find: first, the value of the property actually taken; and second,
the amount of damages to the remaining property.5 5 The jury is
further instructed that damages to the remainder are to be deter-
mined by the difference between the market value of the remainder
before and after the part is taken."'
However, since the narrow strip taken for a limited-access high-
way may have little value in itself but great value as part of the
53. The construction of a service road is not mandatory. Neuweiler v.
Kauer, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 536, 107 N.E.2d 779 (Ct. C.P. 1951). As a practical
matter, however, service roads will be constructed if they substantially miti-
gate damages. Interview with Ward Gronfield, attorney, Minnesota High-
way Department, Feb. 21, 1957.
54. For a comparative analysis of the two formulas see, United States
v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); People v.
Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).
55. E.g., Wiley Drainage Dist. v. Semmens, 80 Colo. 365, 250 Pac.
527 (1926) ; Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 89 S.E.2d 577
(1955) ; Chicago v. Callender, 396 II1. 371, 71 N.E.2d 643 (1947).
56. E.g., Pima County v. De Concini, 79 Ariz. 154, 285 P.2d 609 (1955);
State Highway Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907 (1939) ; Central
Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Lee, 409 Ill. 19, 98 N.E.2d 746 (1951).
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property to which it is attached, many courts also instruct a jury
that they are not to consider the part taken separately but rather in
its relationship to the rest of the tract.5 7 Such instructions may be
confusing to the jury. In determining the value of the part taken,
they may use depreciation in market value of the whole property
due to the taking. Then in determining damages to the remainder,
they may include the same elements as were included in deciding
the value of the part taken, in effect awarding double damages. 58
For example, the jury may determine the value of 10 acres taken
from a 100-acre $50,000 farm to be $7,500, basing their decision on
the decrease in value of the farm to $42,500 after the severance of
the 10 acres. In determining severance damages, the jury could then
decide the value of the remainder before the severance was $45,000,
basing this decision on an average of $500 an acre, and award re-
mainder damages of $2,500 ($45,000 value of remainder before,
less $42,500 value of remainder after). This would make the final
award $10,000, while the farmer would only have suffered a $7,500
injury as a result of the condemnation.
The jury could have arrived at the correct figure by valuing the
part taken at $5,000 (average of $500 per acre for 10 acres), then
deduct that figure from the value of the property before ($50,000)
to get a remainder-before value of $45,000. The severance damages
could then be determined by deducting the market value of the re-
mainder after severance ($42,500) from the market value of the
remainder before severance ($45,000), making the ultimate award
$7,500 ($5,000 value of part taken, plus $2,500 severance damages).
In the example given above, the jury was confused by instruc-
tions designed to correct the seemingly unrealistic idea of valuing
the part taken separately from the rest of the tract.59 The danger
that such confusion will occur is real enough to demand a more
simplified formula with less need for elaborating instructions.
Market before and after
Some courts will instruct a jury that in determining the amount
of compensation they should take the difference between the market
57. E.g., State Highway Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907(1939); Department of Pub. Works and Bldgs. v. Griffin, 305 Ill. 585, 137
N.E. 523 (1922).
58. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Works and Bldgs. v. Griffin, 305 II.
585, 137 N.E. 523 (1922) (where it appears that double damages were
awarded). See also, e.g., State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194
(1936) (where the award was invalidated because double damages had been
given).
59. For further discussion of the problem of confusing instructions in
the value plus damages formula, see 1 Orgel § 52.
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value of the whole property before and after the taking.60 With this
instruction, the jury need not bother with the problem of valuing
the part taken separately from damages to the remainder. In the
illustration given in the preceding section, the jury would merely
deduct $42,500 (value of the land after condemnation) from
$50,000 (value of the land before condemnation). It is obvious that
this formula is easier to apply and is not as confusing as the value
plus damages formula, and perhaps for this reason many courts have
adopted it.61
This formula, however, may allow a set-off for special benefits
in states which do not normally allow such a set-off,6 2 or may result
in a double set-off in states which do allow a set-off for special
benefits. 3 In all states, general benefits may be considered under
this formula.64 As an example of a double set-off of special benefits,
when a limited-access highway is constructed, it may provide a con-
demnee with better drainage facilities. This is a special benefit
which in some states may be set off from the award. Better drainage
facilities would necessarily increase the market value of the property
thus decreasing the difference between market value of the property
before and after condemnation. The condemnee's award would
therefore be lessened. If the value of the special benefit is then set-off
from the already reduced award, the condemnee is twice cursed.
This defect should be remedied with proper instructions.
Since a landowner whose property is condemned is not in the
position of an ordinary seller and cannot take precautions with re-
spect to the use to which the buyer intends to put the land, it is
important that the use the condemnor intends to make of the con-
demned property be considered in awarding compensation for in-
juries to the remainder. Recognizing this, courts hold that the use
for which the parcel is taken must be considered in the award.6
However, some courts state merely that the measure of compensa-
tion is the market value of the whole property before and after the
60. E.g., In re Improvement of Third St., 177 Minn. 159, 225 N.W. 92(1929).; Kamo Elec. Cooperative v. Baker, 287 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1956).
61. See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).
62. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 204 Ind. 631, 185 N.E. 449 (1933) (good
discussion on treatment of benefits in the various states).
63. For discussion on rules as to set-off of special benefits in eachjurisdiction, see 3 Nichols § 8.6211.
64. General benefits are not allowed to be set off or considered. See,
e.g., In re Improvement of Third St., 177 Minn. 159, 225 N.W. 92 (1929).
General benefits are distinguished from special benefits in that the former
benefit the public in general, whereas special beenfits are peculiar to the con-
demnee's land.
65. E.g., State Highway Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907(1939) ; Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922).
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parcel is taken. 66 With this instruction a jury may fail to consider
the prospective public improvement to be placed on the condemned
property. Properly, some courts state that the measure of compensa-
tion is the difference between the market value of the whole tract
before the property is taken and the improvement is made, and the
market value of the remainder after the property is taken and the
improvement is constructed.67
D. Use Value
As has been seen, damages are determined by the use of verbal
formulas based on market value. In turn, determination of market
value involves another concept termed "use value," which encom-
passes the .predominant and all subordinate uses to which the land
may be put. For example, farmland may also be suitable for subdi-
vision into a residential area. Although the best, or predominant, use
of the land is for farming, it has a second best, or subordinate, use
value for subdivision. The predominant use value will primarily de-
termine the market value of the property, however, the subordinate
available uses will also be a factor in the determination.," In con-
demnation for a limited-access highway, the concept of use value
may be of particular significance.
When part of a condemnee's farmland is condemned for an ordi-
nary highway or railroad, the use value of the land as a farm may
be depreciated because of the cost of putting up fences, and the in-
convenience in getting from one tract to another.69 Although the
land will still be purchased for farming purposes as the best or
predominant of all available uses, the owner may receive less for
the land as farmland because of the highway.
However, when a limited-access highway is constructed through
the farm, leaving two parcels of land relatively inaccessible to eac
other, the land may be worthless if valued as a single farming
unit after condemnation. Other available uses of the now severed
parcels must be taken into consideration in determining market
value of the property after severance. Inadequate or unclear instruc-
66. E.g., United States v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811(E.D. Tenn. 1941) ; Greene v. State Bd. of Pub. Roads, 50 R.I. 489, 149 Atl.596 (1930).
67. E.g., State Highway Bd. v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d
907 (1939)'; Mayor and City Council v. Garrett, 120 Md. 608, 87 Atl. 1057
(1913).
68. Most states adopt the "value in view" of all available uses" rule.
E.g., Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 262 Pac. 737 (1928) ; Gilmore v.
Central Maine Power Co., 127 Me. 522, 145 Atl. 137 (1929).
69. E.g., St. Louis, A. & T. R.R. v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167 (1882);
Tonica & Petersburg R.R. v. Unsicker, 22 Ill. 221 (1859).
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tions to the jury on this point may result in the condemnee being
grossly overcompensated.
As examples of the application of use value in condemnation for
a limited-access highway, consider the following situations: 1)
land currently being used as a farm is better suited for other uses
such as for subdivision and development; and 2) land currently
being used as a farm is best suited for that purpose, but there is a
possibility that the land may be subdivided some time in the near
future.
In the first situation, the fact that a limited-access highway has
severed the property completely does not destroy its predominant
use for subdivision. However, the property may be depreciated in
value insofar as its subordinate use for farming has been destroyed.
To the extent that this injury to the subordinate use is reflected on
the market value of the property, compensation must be awarded.
In the second situation, the predominant use is for farming.
After the limited-access highway is built, the predominant use is no
longer for farming but for subdivision, although the availability
of the land for subdivision may be as remote after condemnation as
before. The loss of the prior predominant use value will have a
substantial affect on market value of the property, and insofar as
market value is affected, compensation must be awarded. However,
the land will not be valueless because it has lost its availability as a
single farm unit. It still has some value for purposes of subdivision.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Limited-access highways, recently brought into prominence by
the Federal Interstate Highway System, open up a new era in
faster and safer travel. In this new era, condemnation presents spe-
cial problems. Solutions to some of these problems have been sug-
gested in this Note: more attention should be given to the adequacy
of substituted means of access when direct means of access are
taken; the jury should be given a more simplified formula for deter-
mining damages to the remainder when only part of a condemnee's
property is taken; the judge should carefully explain the "use
,value" concept in his instructions.
Many more special problems may arise once condemnation is
underway. With an awareness of the possible inapplicability of old
rules of law to this relatively modern condemnation situation, the
courts will be more likely to strike a proper balance between the
interests of individual condemnees and the public at large.
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